

Everydayness: “in search of lost time”

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The increasing interest to the problem of everyday being in modern philosophy is predetermined by the crisis of the classical model of subjectivity. Everydayness is one of the phenomena regarded to be a new background for subjectivity under the crisis of identity. The comprehension of everydayness is deeply connected with rethinking of time as the self-name of subjectivity. In this matter, analysis of the phenomenon of everydayness within the dialogue of different cultural traditions is rather urgent. It shows the connection of understanding everydayness with different types of power relations and different modes of subjectivation.

Key words: everydayness, time, power, subjectivity, form, border, place in being

INTRODUCTION

Modernity is evidently marked by a great philosophical interest to the phenomenon of everyday being. The problems of everyday consciousness and everyday language, stereotypes of daily behaviour and the structures of everyday life are among the most urgent themes of postclassical philosophy. One way or another they are discussed in phenomenology, linguistic analysis, fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger, etc. From my viewpoint, the interest to the phenomenon of everyday being takes its roots in modern cultural transformations, which in turn cause the crisis of human identity.

Attempts to find the name for the modern cultural situation, varying in a range from “postclassics” up to “postmodern”, evidently show its transitive and unstable character expressed in breaking the borders among different cultural phenomena. The abovesaid precisely describes the present condition of daily life. On the one hand, it loses its subordinated character and ever more obviously penetrates the public forms of culture, and on the other hand, daily occurrence stores in itself certain stereotypes of behaviour and corporal practices which designate and support ethnic and cultural identity. In this plan, the splash of interest to the problem of daily occurrence in the context of modern philosophy is rather symptomatic. One can note that the beginning of discussing this problem chronologically coincides with the crisis of the New-European type of subjectivity and with the aspiration to recomprehend its basis. In the classical paradigm, the subjectivity was understood as a definite rationally grasping essence without any empiric layers. Everyday life was understood as a sphere which dispersed the self and prevented it from obtaining the essence. That’s why the theme of everyday being was rather marginal for philosophical tradition, since the lat-

ter directed its attention toward the cognition and substantiation of this essence.

It is rather interesting that even the name of the sphere of daily life – “everydayness” – underlined its non-authentic character. The name “everydayness” shows us not only the ordinary *time* but first of all a specific ordinary way of *being*. Everydayness is the self-name of the so-called profane time in its counterpoise to eternity. But this is the reason why it can be understood as the name of time itself, because the time is given to us only “now”, only in the experience of “daily living”. We have here a kind of a paradox: time gives the title to a definite mode of being, unmasking a deep connection between being and time themselves, meanwhile classical philosophy since Parmenide stated a contradiction between them.

However, due to the newest cultural transformations the very possibility of existence of the self as something unique and original becomes quite problematic. The so-called postclassical thinking, caused by the crisis of identity, tries to comprehend the phenomena ignored by classical tradition as a new basis of the self. Everydayness is obviously one of them. Moreover, the problem of everydayness may be discussed in the mainstream of the problem of time. It is postclassical thinking that draws an evident parallel between *the time* and *the self*.

At the same time modern philosophy is marked by a great diversity of the formulation and discussion of this theme, the backgrounds of different concepts being not quite clear and evident. Moreover, they cannot even find any terminological unity in solving this problem. For example, the German tradition worked out the concept “Alltaeglichkeit” as a unite name for all phenomena concerning everyday life, while the traditional English language uses combinations of words with the

adjectives “everyday” or “daily”. “Everydayness” is a neologism introduced by the translators of Martin Heidegger’s works. That’s why one of the aims of this article is to find a link uniting all versions of interpretation of everydayness in postclassical philosophy. In this matter, analysis of the phenomenon of everydayness within the dialogue of different cultural traditions is rather urgent. A comparison of West European and Russian traditions is one of the most fruitful ways, because along with common cultural roots they have their own specific features demonstrating us something like “non-similarity of similar”. This permits to regard the ontological aspects of the problem of everydayness as cultural.

THE PLACE OF EVERYDAYNESS IN WESTERN CULTURE

The unity and identity of culture are deeply connected with the specificity of subjectivity determined by a definite society. The problem of subjectivity types and the modes of subjectivation will be the basis of this work.

According to Bakhtin’s statement, the specificity of any phenomenon is defined by the border. The border of everyday is non-everyday. What does it mean? Besides the most common oppositions “*usual-unusual*”, “*everyday-non-everyday*” where colorless existence is opposed to everydayness events is described by the opposition “*private-public*”. I presuppose that the latter is decisive in the Western understanding of everydayness. But what does this opposition establish? To answer this question, one must understand what type of subjectivity is forming within Western culture and what is the way of its forming. It is well known from Nietzsche’s works that the key to understanding subjectivity is will. But will in turn is deeply connected with power. In the framework of this article, power is regarded to be ontological. (We may remind the readers that J. Deleuze even calls it one of three “figures of Being” – “power” Being’.) So the task is to realize what mode of power relations lays in the basis of the Western type of subjectivity. This task pushes us to refer to the origin of Western culture – to the culture of Ancient Greece.

Regarding the origin of Western culture, one can state that the immanent character of power in the framework of ancient democracy defines the subjectivity with the help of self-governing experience. J. Deleuze in his book „*Foucault*“ tries to explain it with the help of the concept of the “fold”. Subjectivity is only the fold of power; one must be able to govern himself to govern another. The Greeks created the subject but only as a product of subjectivation.

The agonistic relations among the citizens of the Greek State bore the subjectivity as a point of resistance to power by cultivating power inside the self. So subjectivity is a fold of power, but the contours of this

fold become *the border* and the *form* of the subjectivity. The Western subjectivity from the very beginning was forming as a result of realizing the power and as the *form* and the *border*, *differentiation* and *distance*. The person in the framework of this culture aspires not only to be but also to be somebody, to realize himself. The world of the European person is the world of action, realization. One can say that the Western person is a person of vertical line, person of time. The West is moved by the cult of form and the pathos of distance. But a *form* is a result of forming, a *border* is a result of *bordering*. Mutual dependence of the products of this culture upon each other inevitably leads to their unification. A form transforms into a norm, standard and stereotype.

The most vivid manifestation of this feature of the Western culture is found in the practice of community building. The symbol of this community is agora as a political, sacral and commercial center of the state. First of all agora is a square, i.e. it is an open, public, common space. The unity also takes its origin in the public character of power. This type of unity presupposes the norm and the distance as its necessary conditions. But the distance between the self and the other transforms into the distance inside the self, into the distance between open and hidden, public and private. Everything concealed from the light of public has a doubtful value. That is why everydayness as the sphere of private life was understood as a non-authentic mode of human being, because it dispersed the self as the point of resistance.

EVERYDAYNESS AS A PROBLEM OF POSTCLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY

But sooner or later the subjectivity formed outside, from the side of power comes to its negation. Subjectivation transforms into subjection. By the end of the 20th century these processes contributed to Foucault’s radical thesis “to liberate from the self”, which leads to the recomprehension of the basis of subjectivity and as a result – the reopening of the ontological status of everydayness.

In the conditions of Western culture, “to free from the self” means first of all to unmask power, to free from its modulating influence. That’s why the discussion of the most urgent themes of modern philosophy is based on the comprehension of the problem of power. Unmasking the power presupposes breaking the oppositions created by power as well as oppositions inside power. The 20th century reminds us that besides power as such, knowledge as its *alter ego* takes part in forming the Western type of subjectivity. (Let us remind: antiquity creates the cult of the theory, theoretical person; the main subject of New-European philosophy becomes the transcendental subject as the pure possibility of cognition). Knowledge is the other side of power for the western world, knowledge always is

a load with a powerful potential, it is the form of the realization of will, as any judgement is the act of will. Besides, knowledge codifies power relations in the systems of laws and rules which in turn govern the self. Thus, we can state that knowledge also takes part in the process of subjectivation and must be recomprehended under modern conditions. New subjectivity demands a new cognitive model. How is it possible? First of all, one must remember that knowledge has a dual nature, it includes visual and verbal components, seeing and speaking. Antiquity states this difference in the opposition of *eidos* and *logos*. Modern philosophy remembers this opposition as an opportunity to overcome the classical cognitive model and to broaden the limits of understanding the subjectivity. The debate between the visual and the verbal marks the movement of individuation. The status of the word increases with increasing the individuation movement, reducing the subject's pretensions to elevate the world of the visual. The leading historical tendency in this dispute was moving the accents towards the side of the verbal. The image transforms into the word as a ready form and stereotype. A human being loses the ability of seeing—understanding, activism replaces contemplation.

Thus, recomprehension of knowledge in order to find a new subjectivity leads to recomprehension of the question: "What does it mean "to see" and "to speak"?" But seeing is possible only in the space of light, speaking is possible only in the space of language. So light and language, the world of things and the world of words, become the main problem centres of modern philosophy. The majority of philosophical movements studying the phenomenon of everydayness can be classified according to this criterion. The wide range of conceptions which take their roots in Husserl's phenomenology (phenomenological sociology of A. Shutz, ethnomethodology of H. Garfinkel, existential phenomenology of M. Merleau-Ponty, for example), is directed to overcoming the prejudice of vision, to remembering the ontological character of the phenomenological. It pushes them to appeal to the world of direct experience, in a sense to the world of everydayness. Is the movement of the phenomenological wave the movement to "pure" vision? "Back to the things", to the opacity of the world. But their appealing to the everyday sphere, to the sphere of direct experience brings them to the new forms of anonymity, *i.e.* again to a typical perception of the world.

Analogous tendencies can also be noticed in those studies of everydayness which are connected with the analysis of language. The most representative among them are attempts of analytical philosophy to refer to the studying of the language form of daily communication, *i.e.* to refer to the so-called logic of common sense. The result is the same: norm and stereotype as the background of communication and subjectivity.

However, most interesting are undoubtedly the theories that involve in their studies of everydayness both

language and things, the visual and the verbal. The most vivid and fruitful among them is the conception of Martin Heidegger who in his *Being and Time* makes "everydayness" one of the leading concepts of his fundamental ontology. He regards everydayness as a sphere where Dasein precisely is. Heidegger rejects the classical opposition, admits the ontological status of everydayness and tries to find in it the basis of the self. The mode of understanding everyday being is explicated by Heidegger in the terms of "curiosity" and "chatter". The chatter dips Dasein into anonymity deprived of the roots. It is very important that Heidegger underlines the necessity and a definite constitutive force of such understanding, the force of chatter. Within it, from it, against it any authentic understanding, interpretation and communication can be accomplished. So the German thinker breaks the borders between everyday and unusual, describing everydayness as a necessary ontological basis of being of Dasein. Depriving of the roots is not non-being of Dasein, just on the contrary, it is its everyday and firmest reality.

The specific character of seeing in the space of everydayness is described as curiosity. Curiosity is also deprived of the roots, it is homeless and doesn't worry about authentic understanding. It wants to see but not to understand the visual. Curiosity creates a permanent possibility of dispersing. In this word the key to Heidegger's attitude to everydayness is hidden. Dispersing is something opposite to forming the self, it deprives subjectivity of its own character; chatter and curiosity give Dasein the guarantee of supposedly authentic "living life".

This short digression in Heidegger's conception allows us to conclude that the German thinker makes an important step of the ontological comprehension of everydayness, but he cannot miss the attitude to this sphere. The semantics of the words brings him to the role of the judge of everydayness. Everydayness is not in opposition to public, it is the sphere of its living. To some extent Heidegger is a hostage of the European mode of subjectivity, formed by public. The fear of dispersing, losing the authenticity and identity demonstrates his deep dependence on the classical model of the subject.

Thus, the attention paid by Western philosophy of the 20th century to the sphere of everyday being is determined by the crisis of subjectivity and by the attempt to regard everydayness as the background of a new type of subjectivity. Nevertheless, Western philosophers, as a rule, still consider everydayness as an anonymous mode of sociality, irrespective of its positive or negative evaluation.

EVERYDAYNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY

An opposite interpretation of the role of everyday being can be found within the space of Russian culture, in the

works of V. Rosanov. Rosanov's philosophy of everydayness is determined by some fundamental priorities of Russian culture, realizing the transcendental character of power. The type of subjectivity born by this culture is marked with an absence of a finished form, the will to realization, "non-actualization". It is not determined by the self-governing experience, but by assimilation of the space, by the place in being. The archetype of home is one of the main ones in the space of Russian culture. Thus, the Russian model of subjectivity is not the result of power, it is formed by a place in being.

This specific trait of Russian culture is evident in the model of sociality. The idea of unity, which governs Russian culture, realizes itself in the principle of "sobornost". "Sobor" (cathedral) also realizes the archetype of home, place, but it is a sacral place. So the unity is predefined and sanctified by a transcendent sacral authority. This unity is formed not due to equality in power but to equality and responsibility in the face of God. So it is free from the cult of the border. The Russian mentality presupposes unity not as the result of forming and bordering but as the experience of gathering fragmented parts of being in the space of place, home.

That's why Rosanov's philosophy designs the world of everydayness, the world of one's home, place as the necessary condition for the human being. The existence "without the place in the world" is equal to non-being. Returning the forgotten ontological meaning of the Russian word "быт" (daily life), Rosanov justifies everydayness as a place in being, marked by the appropriate character of human actions. The rehabilitation of the daily and current postulates the meaningful and sacral character of everyday being. While stating that eternal is given only through everyday, "now" and "here", in the fleeting events, trivialities, "the cobweb of daily life", the Russian philosopher realizes the religious-ontological turning from the emptiness of the public to the intimate and sacral space of home as a condition of forming the subjectivity. Making himself at home, the human being overcomes the distance between himself and the being. The subjectivity is born as a result of the dialogue with Another, understood through the sympathetic reception of the originality of the being, a compassionate meeting with another individuality and a non-discursive dialogue with God as the highest ontological reality. Rosanov's everydayness doesn't create isolation and distance but *solitariness*, which, on the one hand, presupposes the rights of the subject to have his own world and, on the other, breaks the circle of loneliness, which is overcome by the refusal of expansionistic, conscious-volitional efforts.

The dialogue with God is displayed through silence, weeping, prayer. The prayer lies in "the very essence of the world"; it is the medium between the sacral and the mundane. It is Rosanov's "dance of prayer" where subjectivity without a complete form and willing expansionism is born.

Thus, the analysis of the problem of everydayness in the dialogue of Western and Russian cultures shows that these types of subjectivity are both opposite and complementary. This problem has a long history, but our time sharpens it, because it breaks and rebuilds all old models. Probably the search of a new subjectivity will be fruitful only in the case of overcoming the extremes of both models where the "vertical" of time must be supplemented by the "horizontal" of space.

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KASDIENYBĖ: „IEŠKANT PRARASTO LAIKO“

Santrauka

Padidėjusį susidomėjimą kasdienio buvimo problema sąlygoja klasikinio subjektyvumo modelio krizė. Kasdienybė – vienas

fenomenų, iškilusių naujo subjektyvumo fone, veikiant tapatumo krizei. Kasdienybės refleksija esmiškai susijusi su laiko kaip subjektyvumo moduso apmąstymu. Šia prasme kasdienybės fenomeno analizė, esant skirtingų kultūrinių tradicijų dialogui, nepaprastai aktuali. Tai rodo kasdienybės supratimo sąsajas su įvairiais jėgos santykiais ir subjektyvacijos modusais.

Raktažodžiai: laikas, kasdienybė, jėga, subjektyvumas, forma, riba, būtis