

# History: the problem of individuation

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The essay explicates the formation of inter-subjective awareness which is a necessary ground of any lifeworld. It discloses the temporally and spatially non-positional awareness which comprises the continuously extensioning and deepening polycentric field of perceptions. The field is accessible to anyone and anytime and thus provides an ahistorical background for any historical time and location of events in such a time. This non-positional awareness is transcendental and is inadequate for the understanding of the presence of individual differentiations. As universal, it consists of eidetic structures that are common to everyone. Hence the essay shows that while history is accessible at this level, it also shows another dimension of awareness – the corporeal – at which history is made, built in concrete projects. The making is premised on the awareness of the primacy of “I can” which consists of acquired abilities, in distinction to those of others providing the differentiation among individuals engaged in concrete tasks. The analyses, at this level, show the ways the engaged activities comprise “inter-corporeal” commonalities and individuating differentiations.

**Key words:** individuation, awareness, history, body in action

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## INTRODUCTION

Current philosophical literature is historiocentric; even such radical trends as semiotics, with its tendency to exclude the diachronic in favor of synchronic analyses, appeals to some historical transformations of sign systems (Greimas 1987: 204ff). Also the predominant trends of philosophical hermeneutics and dialectics seem to claim the primacy of history. The former emphasizes the lived world as truly historical, while the latter seeks some dialectical structure as a basis of historical changes. With respect to dialectics, Husserl had noted that “it is replete with paradoxes and logical nonsense. Nowhere is the confusion so great, resulting in disputations and logical aporiae” (Husserliana IV: 123). It could be suggested that dialectics and hermeneutics presume philosophical “lingualism” and engage in verbal disputations and are therefore misled by language. Husserl also offers such a suggestion (Ibid. VI: 372). Obviously, phenomenology does not reject logical argumentation, and indeed much of its work stays within the parameters of logic. The objections to dialectical and historicizing argumentations are more fundamental. Husserl seems to object to the “self-evidence” with which the dialecticians and the historicizers accept the traditional conceptualities. If one claims that there IS history, one has not offered any grounds for such a claim. Certainly, daily life does not post signs suggesting that the encountered phenomena, including daily discourse, are historical. The latter is a complex reflective constitution and requires critical ac-

cess to its own undertaking. Such an access is phenomenological and must begin with the life of awareness.

## FUNDAMENTAL LIFE OF AWARENESS

The problems of history and lived awareness hinge on the constitution of the self and others. Historicisms claim that the *we* is prior to the *I*, without explicating the manner in which one comes to such claims and how then is the individual possible. In order to suggest some of the issues concerning the self and others, it is necessary to perform a radical *epoche* on the experienced content and focus on the access to the experiencing activity of awareness. This opens Husserl’s problem of the “primordial, passive stream,” the “Heraclitean flow” for whose constitutive moments we lack names; there is nothing found in the flow that would be an objective identity. Names, after all, apply only to the constituted identities, to the already objectified sense units (Landgrebe 1963: 200). Such units, rudimentary terms of reference, are discovered only in “subsequent” reflection which traces something already constituted in the flux, such as an identity of an ego that finds itself as identical in the flow. How can this ego, discovered in the flow, be identical with the ego enacting the flow? The latter cannot be exhausted in the represented, the flowing ego, i. e. the already objectified ego present as reflected content. The ego experiences itself in the flow of its already accomplished acts. “Its own identity, encompassing both, cannot become an object but is rather

ahead of any objectification and is not reducible to an objectifying act of reflection" (ibid.: 205). The transcendental ego is anonymous and the anonymity cannot be eradicated by reflection. The problem, thus, emerges concerning the access, if any, to the primordial life of awareness.

Given this scope of problems, it becomes obvious that one trace various levels of constitutive activities in an effort to exhibit the extent of phenomenological visibility of the absolute life of awareness. Such a tracing reveals various modalities of time constitution such that each modality shows an impenetrable wall of anonymity, "being too late", and objectivity. This means that the presence of the experienced ego to the aware ego reveals a distance between them, a distance that is the very condition of such an experience. How is this distance to be understood? One must perform a "radicalizing *epoche*" in order to open the acting side of the living stream of experience that allows a tracing of the living present, a present not to be understood in an ordinary sense; the present of the ego is not given on the basis of a presupposed temporal position. The radicalizing *epoche* also brackets the conception of temporal succession. The present of the ego, its presence, could be called *ur-modal* or primordial, pre-temporal or originary (Held 1966: 63).

This *epoche* shows that the flow is constituted and must be interrogated with a view to the very conditions of its being; in brief, to what makes it possible. At this juncture, various characteristic modalities emerge for the decipherment of the seemingly impenetrable life: "already given and constituted", leading to questions such as "what constitutes it", and "is the constitutive process given in its immediacy and apodicticity?" Obviously, this is more than an attempt at direct phenomenological manifestation of phenomena; there are moments of philosophizing argumentation concerning the status of the phenomena, the priority of one phenomenon over another, the questions of foundations and what constitutes more and less basic phenomena. The argumentative procedure transcends the phenomenological strictures and, due to the most fundamental questions, leads to unique interpretation of problems and resolutions. Landgrebe has pointed this out (Landgrebe 1982: 72).

Returning to the question of what makes the stream of activities possible, the answer is obviously the originary function of the ego. The ego is given as the endlessly reiteratable "I can". This "I can" is encountered at any temporal locus in the stream of lived awareness. Yet any reflection on the "I can," on the primal function of the ego, reveals the ego as a temporal object. While the constitutive ego appears as standing and pre-temporal, it is also experienced as temporal, streaming within the accomplished activities. The living present of the ego appears reflectively as a pre-temporal standing in constant transformation. This analysis, therefore, yields an adequate, but not apodictic evidence of the ego's life as a constant streaming. The best that can be attained

is the ego's constant reflection upon itself, constituting a stream and revealing the original streaming of the transcendental ego. In this sense the insight into temporality and simultaneous reflectivity and objectification of the transcendental ego leads phenomenology to experience its ultimate, critical, and apodictic foundation. This is the view maintained by Seebohm (Seebohm 1962: 105). He argues that according to this interpretation the temporalizing ego is grasped in reflection as already temporalized and objectified.

Yet according to Held, and indeed Landgrebe (Landgrebe 1963: 201f), this fails to account for both the possibility of discussing the absolute ego as the "functioning ego" and how the absolute ego becomes accessible to objectification. Phenomenology must decipher the ultimately functioning subjectivity, if it is to adhere to its principle of not accepting any prejudgments and phenomena without first grounding them in awareness. Thus, if the founding transcendental subjectivity is left out of consideration, then phenomenology would be based on unwarranted assumptions and would have to surrender its claim to be a presuppositionless philosophy. Hence, against Seebohm's interpretation, Held argues that the fundamental task of phenomenology is to extricate the ultimately functioning subjectivity from the self-objectification of the ego (Held 1966: 76f). If this task could not be accomplished, then one could not show phenomenologically that the presently functioning ego and the objectified ego are the same. But to establish this we must resolve another issue. Since the sameness of the ego is given in reflection, what then makes reflection possible?

For an ego to turn back upon itself, to revert to itself, it must already have constituted a gap between the experiencing and the experienced ego. At the same time, and despite the gap and hence a division, the unity between them cannot be lost. Thus, it is argued that the reflecting ego must identify itself with the ego reflected upon. Given this argument for identity, one has to show how it can be achieved phenomenologically. In what sense the functioning-acting ego can be identified with the object ego, or the just enacted ego? Is the just enacted given as an ego or merely as an act? If it is given as an ego, then the currently reflecting and functioning ego is more than the just enacted ego; the former contains all the possibilities of enactment while the latter is exhausted in the act that it has just performed. But if the just enacted is an act, then it cannot be identical with the currently acting ego, since this ego is performing acts of reflection upon the just performed act. On the other hand, it would be an unwarranted presumption to claim that the currently functioning ego is more than the act upon which it is reflecting. After all, phenomenological explication cannot grant more than what is given, and how it is given. If the reflecting ego is performing an act, then one cannot claim that it is more than the act performed. Moreover, is there a tacit and unwarranted assumption in the term "just enacted",

suggestive of a sequence of acts? Do the acts themselves come with a given sign of temporal sequence? This is by no means a necessity.

Held attempts to deal with these philosophical problems both by argument and phenomenological description. In reflection, the ego attains its accomplished act, its just having functioned, as retended. Concurrently, as the presently reflecting ego, it grasps itself as acting. For the reflecting ego, the distance between the act being performed and the just enacted is experienced as bridged. Reflection experiences unity in separation, identity in difference. The reflecting unification with itself, constituting the experience of bridging the distance and keeping an identity of itself at the present, is possible because the ego enacts a constant streaming. The possibility of self-reflection emerges on the basis of the constancy of streaming as well as on the basis of the streaming constancy of the ego. This is the originary passive constitution where the transitory synthetic presencing of the ego to itself occurs. Thus, all reflection is founded on the self-presencing of the originary functional ego "before reflection". As Brand states, it is the functioning of "reflection in inception" (Brand 1955: 66).

The ego-logical functioning of the living present is seen as a pre-accomplishment of passive transitional syntheses that are equivalent to self-presencing. In each recouping reflection, the ego of the pre-temporal living present encounters itself as the streaming, self temporalizing object. In any added reflection the ego is encountered irrevocably as a temporalized object. Thus, reflection never encounters the standing streaming ego as a living present, in pure pretemporality. This is not an inadequacy of reflection; rather, it reveals that there is no ego presence which is not presencing and thus self-presencing. In this sense, the ego is never a pure ego, never a pole without a temporal objectivity. The ego has itself as an object and as transcendence in a way that a pure ego immanence cannot be extricated. The notion of an immanent stream of conscious life is thereby relativised. Thus, the meaning of transcendence of the natural world is already encountered in the living stream; the latter is already temporalized as the first and thus "immanent transcendence". All this is understood in terms of sense and not of ontology.

The immanent transcendence, as the first objectivation, forms a temporal objectivity encounterable in the objective topography of time and thus reproducible. The passing, the streaming present as objective past is the first objectivity in immanence, the first meaning of transcendence. At the same time it is the foundation of history in the form of first temporality. Objectification and temporalization of the noetic stream constitute the topoi for all objectivities and for historical events. History is therefore constituted of this first temporalization and transcendence.

While there is an intuitive agreement that the immediate life of consciousness is pretemporal, there is no unanimity concerning the manner of its givenness. Brand

contends that the prereflective synthesis is founded on the primordial passing of the ego and its constitution of the ground for differentiation which is at the same time a self-identification in the originary transitional syntheses. As he states, "I am present to myself in a specific form of the now without becoming objective, without mediation" (Ibid.: 63). But Held points out that this betrays the presence of objectifying temporalization; the very naming of the "now" destroys immediacy and assumes a temporal field (Ibid.: 105). If reflection is temporalization and the primordial life is pretemporal, then any reflection will have to explicate the pretemporal in a temporal way. It has been a persistent phenomenological finding that any temporal awareness is essentially incomplete and can never obtain apodicticity – of course, we may add that we have eidetic and apodictic awareness of this incompleteness. Any grasp of pretemporality must remain at the prereflective level.

Permanence in transition is the constitution of the ground of inter-subjectivity and history. It opens an access to the meaning of otherness. This means that the origin of the experience of the sense of the other is given in the pretemporal activity of the ego. Since the ego is anonymous to itself and its own apodictic evidence of itself, then it cannot claim to be more certain of itself than of the other. Waldenfels agrees with this assessment. If the ego is an anonymous life, then it cannot have the slightest power of disposal over itself; it needs not be understood solipsistically or even ego-logically; it could be prior to all intentional activity and receptivity (Waldenfels 1971: 36). Given this context, it is difficult to say which activities are of the ego and which belong to the alter-ego. Held points out that at the anonymous level there emerges a first connection between an ego and an alter-ego. This emergence is necessitated by the slippage, the stance in transition, and the reflective recouping of the self in that transition in an immediate recognition of itself as other and self. The originary self-constitution is coequal with the we-constitution. Thus, the "other functioning" is at this level of anonymity not yet distinguishable from the self functioning. The only difference is the sense of self and other and the first and second person designation (Held 1966: 168). These are, of course, dependent on linguistic traditions.

Having a sense of the other as being with is not separable from being the atemporal, anonymous self in the self-presencing of the ego. This means that common ontification, temporalization presupposes an anonymous inter-subjectivity already present in the constant slippage of the ego, constituting the transcendental area of atemporality containing the copresence of other functional presents, of the sense of others. This sense leads to the notion that each experience of the other, in its originary ontification, i.e. its immanent transcendence, constitutes a horizon wherein the experience of all others as copresent leads to the notion of the living present as an indefinite horizon encompassing the totality of all egos and their self temporalization. What is to be noted is

that such an encompassment is given in the originary reflection, and hence constitutes an originary temporalization.

Waldenfels has exemplified in detail the polycentric field in terms of inter-subjectivity and dialogical mutuality, showing that the field is essentially triadic. This is to say, to speak is to speak to someone about something, to do something with someone is to be world and other oriented without positing the other as an object of interrogation (Waldenfels 1971: 134ff). The dialogue is not restricted to two present subjects in face of a topic or a task, but may include the views imbedded in established modes of activity and language. In this sense, it is a field that has not yet become historical as a temporal succession of events or dates but is coextensive with the subjects engaged in the dialogue and tasks. The triadic composition of the field opens another problematic level: history and individuation. This seems to suggest that the anonymous life of awareness, as this very history, leads to an unanswered question as to the status of the individual.

## HISTORY

Given the atemporal character of history as a field with triadic and polycentric structure, it becomes obvious that the given objectivities are not blind facts but bear meaning and can be regarded as traces to the constituting activities of transcendental inter-subjectivity. Without the latter, history has no foundation and can become posited as a self-generating event that dominates over people. The first task is to show that factual history and essential awareness are not antithetical in at least two important ways. First, history is completely tied to human experience, and second, the historical extension of awareness from generation to generation is not material but signitive. This is to say, what is transmitted is the essential meaning and not brute facticity. Indeed, the latter is not even a possible given in any phenomenological sense. Every "fact" is basically a system of awareness (Landgrebe 1982: 111).

The polycentric field was thought to be inherent in the always and already anonymously functioning absolute subjectivity and its first traces of temporalization and its primordial institution of the sense of "we consciousness" in the flow of actions. This meant that any objectivity encountered in time is an indicium, a trace of the absolute life leading to the experience that the historical facticities are not bracketed contingencies but the essential traces of the constitutive acts of transcendental subjectivity. Indeed, the "already given objectivities" point to the sedimented modalities of the active process of judging, predicating, perceiving, as constituted in the pre-predicative life of consciousness (Husserl 1963: 21). The sense of the real encountered in experience implies a specific conscious process wherein the real appears as "this kind," or having "this type" of being. This means that the question about the essence of specific entities,

historical and cultural objectivities, their significance becomes the question of conscious activities, intentionalities. Every given objectivity in time is already subtended by and correlated to the temporalizing actions and the essential structures of such objectivity (Claesges 1967: 27f). Every objectivity, then, encountered in historical sedimentation, is accessible to any subjectivity. If the pretemporal awareness has no pre-given temporal location, if it is everytime, "all time," then any objectivity in historical time is traceable "vertically" to the transcendental conditions required for its constitution.

If all beings, including ourselves as worldly in a specific self-understanding of who we are, were taken as clues, then they would no longer function as accidental, contingent facticities serving to exemplify eidetic necessities, but would be beyond the difference between them. Each being, including ourselves, becomes a historically factual necessity answering the question: what is necessarily presupposed in the constituting activities, i. e. what sense of constitution is required, both unconditionally universal and factually contingent, to yield a being of a specific perceptual type and meaning? This is exactly where the difference between the fact and the essence must surrender. But typological experience precludes individuation. How shall this issue be solved?

One common answer proposed to solve this issue is that individuation can be accounted for through body. Body can be the distinguishing factor. Yet what makes corporeity individual, "my" corporeity, cannot be based on physiological conceptions. My body is recognizable on the basis of activities as mine. It is to be noted that the term "activity" does not designate a substance or an entity "in action" but a corporeity whose very constitution is activity, whose every shape is a kinesthetic formation. In this sense, activity is neither an inner nor an outer characteristic of corporeity, but a structuration that can be regarded as the "nature" side of transcendental subjectivity and, in a somewhat rough fashion, coextensive with it. The movements that are not simply serial but overlapping subtend all formations of sensory receptivity, and yet could not be designated as "active". They belong to the anonymous background of enactments wherein objective correlates appear.

If such activities are taken as basic, then the historical field, as noted above, is coextensive with enactments and their objective correlates. At the same time such a field seems to be unavoidable *a priori*. Yet if the activities are to be taken as founding, then it would seem that the *a priori* becomes a factual process. How can a factual process become *a priori* and in turn encompass the field? This issue can be stated as follows: how is it possible to accommodate the facticity of our activities and by implication the facticity of historical field with phenomenological claims of essential and generally valid insights? Husserl was well aware of this issue (Husserl 1963: 362). Historical facts are understandable from an *a priori* stance, yet the *a priori* presupposes the contingency of the corporeal field. If one claims that phenomenology is a

rigorous science, then the latter emerges as a facet in the field while presupposing the field as factual. This is to say, the *a priori* is embedded in the historical field which is also factual. In face of this dilemma, Husserl posited an infinite idea of history as teleological. Yet, as Professor Huertas-Jourda argues, this very positing is based on an uncritical acceptance of modern evolutionism and, one might add, historicism (Huertas-Jourda).

### BODY IN ACTION

While in his earlier works Husserl still spoke of empirical data as given, in *Ideen II* and in *Krisis* this view is undercut by the functioning of corporeity; the latter belongs to the passive side of transcendental subjectivity, yet in such a way that it transgresses the factual and the essential while founding in its generality both. The constitutive activities subtend the empirical data and show that the latter appear on the basis of the kinesthetic constitution of temporality. This means that even the primordial data are apperceptive. The impressional data already have a form and content and both are mediated by constitutive activities of temporalization which provide a duration for the data. Without apperception there are no impressions, and without kinesthesia there are no apperceptions. The urimpressions are synthetic units of kinesthesia. In this sense, kinesthetic consciousness is time consciousness. This means, furthermore, that corporeity is not constituted but constitutive. It is a system of activities to which sense fields are coordinated, and as such it is on the side of transcendental subjectivity. This makes a precedent of corporeity as “I can”, provided that no phenomenological credence is given to the “I”. It could be said provisionally that the empowerments of corporeity are genetically prior to the appearance of the ego, or the discovery of the “mine” precedes the discovery of the ego.

Here the world and other relationships are predelineated. But this subjectivity does not have the world as something facing it but something that is coextensive with it. The world is to the extent that our corporeal activities constitute it in synthetic praxis and articulation: we know of it as much as is announced in corporeal activities. The activities are not at our disposal but are what we are in praxis, and the world is the praxis world. And this is precisely why the world escapes us as an object or subject and remains as an anonymous groundless ground. Nonetheless, it bears in itself the principle of both individuation and other relatedness, their difference and commonality. Without the corporeal activities, consciousness of self is a presupposition, a condition for the possibility of experience but not an experience of the individual self or ego.

The question of the individual is not answered purely on the transcendental arguments for the ego. Individuality is to be sought elsewhere. It is precisely such a search that leads to the absoluteness of the factual individual and inter-individual relationships: contingent

absoluteness. How is this contingency to be understood? Our contention is that this field and its field nature are predelineated in its factual life as a constant activity and a structuration of the perceptual world. The ego is an achievement of factual enablements which are field data. In this sense, action to which the ego is ascribed is an absolute fact. Its necessity is neither essential nor contingent. Both are subtended by the acting corporeity and its systematic engagements with practical affairs. What follows from such an absolute fact is that any essential and contingent determinations of it are inadequate. In this sense, it is without ground. One could claim that the activities are constitutive of, while being unconstituted by, the phenomenal field. Given this, it is now possible to take the last step toward the tracing of the question of individuality and inter-subjectivity.

Bodily activities constitute an ineradicable facticity that is not dumb but an articulated process which does not emerge into the foreground – specifically since it is not entitative but constitutive of spacio-temporalization as a field of patterns. The latter are neither interior nor exterior; hence reflective awareness is inadequate to grasp it. Rather it is taken for granted point of departure for any investigation of the lived world and the field of history. Each gesture and movement is accomplished spontaneously and recognized in correlation to, and distinction from, the others. From childhood on there is a vital-kinesthetic exploration of the world and the constitution of corporeal abilities as effective. One can reach something, move something, pull, push, lift and throw. This effectivity comprises its own domain of cognition.

Prereflective, corporeal movements constitute their own self-reflexivity and self-reference. In a missed attempt to reach something, the attempt is immediately repeated. The missing comprises an instance of movement which reflects back upon itself and calls for a variation of itself in a second attempt. There is a direct kinesthetic question whether I can do this, revealing at the outset an already articulated field of abilities and tasks with possible variations that never offer a final, factual limitation. Here one builds a recognition of oneself in terms of what one can do. This self-recognition is coextensive with the recognition of the abilities as mine, as kinesthetically reflexive and at the same time coextensive with and differentiated from those of others. “I cannot do this” means that not only I have tried and failed, but that I have seen others perform it. The correlation of abilities and inabilities is an inter-corporeal experience present in the handling of tasks and undertakings. Corporeal abilities comprise an understanding of commonalities and individuating differences.

The commonality has two components: first, the common task in which we are engaged, and second, the continuity of activities that differentiate themselves into variations. We lift something, but you do it from that side and I do it from this. While the end you are lifting is heavier, you can and I cannot lift that end, yet I can lift this end, and thus discover a common activity and its

corporeal differentiation. This constitutes a polycentric field of activities. Investigations reveal the possible variations that take over the suggestion of *Cartesian Meditations* concerning empathy. At the active level the term “empathy” can be modified by “filling in”. It is quite a common notion; we do fill in for someone at the job, by taking over a function, or by putting our shoulder to the task from another side. All these functions suggest a commonality and a variation. This is corporeal individuation and an inter-corporeal field which is neither a simple fact nor an essence; it subtends both. Concurrently, there is a level of reflexivity, of direct apperception of the self and the other on the basis of activities that both undertake. Her ability to reach something, and my lack of such an ability despite my efforts reflect directly our corporeal commonality of reaching and our differences. Thus, “I can” is prior to the pure “I”.

The factual states of affairs correlated to our activities are equally prior to essentiality and brute factuality. Rather they have an open explorability and generality, specifically with respect to their practical functions. It should be noted that history is not thought but built, made in practical engagements. Such engagements reveal another aspect of activities that could be called dimensional, leading to corporeal analogization of the field of praxis. The active handling of objects does not exhibit a one-to-one correlation between activities and the objects. Each activity can range over various and typologically distinct objects and tasks. The hand can pick up a stone, a hammer, a stick and use any of them to pound a stick into the ground. And this constitutes a primal analogization in two senses. First, one can perform similar activities and recognize them directly anywhere and any place prior to historical temporalization, and second, the activities perform a passive analogization of objects by using them as interchangeable in face of a task. The hammer, the stone and the stick are analogates by virtue of the generality of our abilities. In this sense, “I can” is a factual generality that cannot be reduced either to a closed essence or a brute fact. One can then claim that the historical field is recognized by the interchanging functions as analogous to one another, capable of filling in one another, and equally by the facts as systems, not revealing essentialities, as was shown at the outset, but various corporeally recognizable analogous interconnections.

But this means that there is no necessary interconnection among all activities; some are continued, others discontinued, and still others postponed, thus constituting varied time structures and task structurations that prohibit any teleological direction to history. With such a prohibition, any quest for history as something unidirectional and above the activities and tasks that build it ceases to make sense. The activities are of course interconnected in various ways, inclusive of the above delimited commonalities and differentiations, yet they comprise a field without a *telos*, without a direction and hence a continuous building but not in any sense temporal building. It is rather an *atemporal* intersection of activities wherein the

so-called past and the presumed future, as ontologizations, come too late. In brief, the lived world as historical is a world of praxis that does not admit either of essentiality or of facticity; rather both are coextensive with what Husserl describes as “primordial *techné*”.

While a great amount of historical work is based on written texts, such texts constantly refer to the actions and deeds of persons facing common and diverse tasks. In this sense, texts are explications of the practical architectonics of the world. Architectonics includes all that humans build, from implements through palaces. When we pick up a stone sharpened to cut, skin, sculpt, we recognize what they could do and what we can do. When we dig up a row of stones, we see through them the “more” of a building that we can reconstruct and understand how they lived, oriented and structured their living space and time. Architectonics is a map of how people lived and the structure of the world they possessed. Historical documents are correlates and extensions of our understanding of people’s concrete lives because we understand the “I can” of human activities.

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**ISTORIJA: INDIVIDUALIZACIJOS PROBLEMA**

**S a n t r a u k a**

Straipsnyje plėtojama ir nagrinėjama intersubjektyvaus supratimo struktūra, kuri visuomet atsiremia į gyvenamąjį pasaulį. Ji atidengia laikiškumą ir erdviškumą nepozicinio supratimo, kuris aprėpia nenutrūkstamą tęstinumą ir pagilina policentrinį patyrimo lauką. Šis laukas visada yra prieinamas kiekvienam, ir tai suteikia aistorinį pamatą bet kuriam istorinio įvykio laikui ir vietai. Toks nepozicinis supratimas yra transcendentali-

nis ir yra neadekvatus individualių skirtumų supratimui. Būdamas universalus, jis turi eidetines struktūras, bendras visiems. Taigi straipsnyje argumentuojama, kad nors šiuo lygmeniu istorija yra prieinama, ji taip pat atskleidžia kitą supratimo lygmenį – materialųjį – kuriame rutuliojasi konkrečių įvykių istorija. Tai remiasi „aš galiu“ pirmumo suvokimu, kuriame glūdi įgytos galimybės, priešingai nei numanoma perskyra tarp individų, atliekančių konkrečias užduotis. Šio lygmens analizė atskleidžia būdus, kaip susiję veiksmai sudaro „tarpkūniškus“ bendrumus ir individualizuojančius skirtumus.

**Raktažodžiai:** individualizacija, įsisąmoninimas, istorija, veiklus kūnas