Filosofija. Sociologija / Philosophy. Sociology
 ISSN 0235-7186 ISSN 2424-4546 (online) |
2016 m. Nr. 1 Defusing counterexamples against motivational internalism
Externalists argue that motivation is external to moral judgments on the grounds that people can be unmoved by their moral judgments. I reply that people sometimes act indifferently to their moral considerations not because their moral judgments lack motivation but because their moral judgments are obstructed by rival desires. It appears that the moral motivation wanes while the moral judgments linger. In reality, however, the moral motivation is only made inconspicuous by the motivation of the opposing desires. A moral judgment is subject to obstruction just like an emotive judgment and a gustatory judgment.
Keywords: oral judgment, motivational internalism, motivational externalism, obstruction |
Numeriai:
2017 - T.28 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2016 - T.27 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2015 - T.26 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2014 - T.25 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2013 - T.24 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2012 - T.23 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2011 - T.22 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2010 - T.21 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2009 - T.20 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2008 - T.19 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2007 - T.18 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2006 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2005 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2004 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2003 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2002 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 2001 Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4 |