There are three interrelated problems that threaten the overall cogency and acceptability of contemporary virtue ethics as an ethical theory. These problems fall under three categories: (1) practical, (2) theoretical, and (3) epistemic. In the process of articulating these problems, the paper employs and offers cases from medicine and everyday life to bring to the fore significant issues that need to be addressed, most especially contemporary virtue ethics’ seeming inability to accommodate some intuitions that we have regarding what right actions consist in. The paper also articulates the view that being virtuous, like being excellent, can be understood in terms of degrees. As stated earlier, the three problems are interrelated, thus, adherents of contemporary virtue ethics need a systematic approach through which these problems might be put to rest.

Numeriai:

2017 - T.28
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2016 - T.27
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2015 - T.26
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2014 - T.25
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2013 - T.24
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2012 - T.23
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2011 - T.22
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2010 - T.21
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2009 - T.20
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2008 - T.19
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2007 - T.18
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2006
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2005
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2004
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2003
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2002
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2001
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